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Tajikistan: a chronic stagnation 
Józef Lang
Since gaining its independence Tajikistan has faced severe political, economic and social pro-
blems. The last several months has seen a clear increase in their intensity. This is in part caused 
by the deteriorating economic situation in Russia and the significant fall of remittances from 
the Tajik labour migrants in Russia, as well as by President Emomali Rahmon’s rising authori-
tarianism. Despite this intensification, qualitatively speaking Tajikistan’s problems have been 
unchanged for years. Besides the state’s structural weakness, the main cause is the ongoing 
neo-colonial dependence on Russia, which effectively limits Dushanbe’s  room for political 
manoeuvre and keep Tajikistan in Russia’s sphere of control. This dependence on the one hand 
protects the country from collapsing, but on the other it precludes the development of the 
state, resulting in Tajikistan’s enduring stagnation. Similar processes also take place in other 
countries of post-Soviet Central Asia. However, in the case of Tajikistan the dependence and 
stagnation it causes are the strongest and their mechanisms most easily observed.  
Causes of the dependence 
Phenomena such as Tajikistan’s chronic weak-
ness, the constant lack of prospects for the 
state’s development as well as significant, his-
torically-based, unbroken ties with Russia, are 
all interlinked and have a decisive influence on 
the situation in the country. The intensity, char-
acter and dynamics of Tajikistan’s dependence 
on Russia, as well as the lack of alternatives to 
it, allow the situation to be described as neo-co-
lonial, a term which is key in analysing the pro-
cesses taking place in Tajikistan.
Tajikistan’s weakness is the primary factor which 
forces the country to be dependent on external 
assistance. Tajikistan is the poorest country of 
the former USSR, with significant social prob-
lems, an undeveloped economy, authoritarian 
government and advanced civilizational regres-
sion. Ways in which Tajikistan’s weakness ex-
presses itself in the political dimension in are: 
the ineffectiveness of the state institutions and 
their level of corruption1, the political instability 
of the state2, simultaneously combined with the 
authoritarianism of the government. The state 
apparatus is dysfunctional – its various institu-
tions, rather than perform the tasks which they 
were established to implement, constitute el-
ements of a corruption system3; this results in 
1 Tajikistan ranked 136th from the 162 countries reviewed in 
the “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015”. Corruption has 
a systemic character and is present not only in relations 
between the citizens and the state, but also constitutes 
an important element of the political system as such. 
2 This is visible, for example, in the cyclically occurring 
violence. Examples of that are the clashes in Khorug in 
2012 between the central government forces and the in-
formal local Pamiri leaders, and the skirmishes between 
the government forces and the former deputy minister 
of defence in September 2015. More in: http://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-09-09/tadzyki-
stan-wiceminister-obrony-do-odstrzalu
3 For example, the role of the Tajik state structures in 
the drug smuggling from Afghanistan – Tajikistan is 
an important smuggling route for Afghan heroin sold on 
to the Russian market. The revenues of Tajik elite from 
this criminal activity may reach as much as several bil-
lion US dollars annually; http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2014/vol1/223077.htm
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the state’s far-reaching political ineffectiveness. 
Reforms aimed at genuine improvement have 
not been attempted in the country. All of the 
above, combined with the scale of the challeng-
es that Tajikistan is facing, mean that Dushanbe 
is forced to seek external political support in or-
der to secure the durability of its rule. 
The economic situation of Tajikistan does not 
allow the state to function independently. 
Tajikistan’s economy is small and undeveloped4. 
The economy’s frailty leads to a pauperisation 
of society, especially in rural areas – about 42% 
of Tajikistan’s population lives below the pov-
erty line5. The lack of a drive towards modern-
isation, combined with an absence of energy 
resources (the export of which are the basis for 
the revenue of the region’s wealthier states – 
above all Kazakhstan), result in Tajikistan being 
unable to be economically independent, and 
therefore in need of external support also in this 
regard. The state apparatus receives assistance 
of this kind from the international financial in-
stitutions and various states (above all China), 
which provide financing for particular projects 
and institutions. For society, the presence of 
Tajik labour migrants in Russia provide this sup-
port, in the form of remittances, which are the 
main source of income for society. Due to Ta-
jikistan’s rapid demographic growth (between 
2000 and 2014 country’s population increased 
by 2.1 million people – 35%), labour migration 
4 In 2014 GDP stood at US $ 9.24 billion (US $ 1,114 per 
capita), while the main branches of the economy included 
agriculture (23.46% of GDP) and trade (14.37% of GDP). 
World Bank and Tajik Statistical Agency data, available 
at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan and 
http://www.stat.tj/ru/macroeconomic-indicators/
5 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/tajikistan_2013.pdf
also plays an important socio-political role, as it 
allows social tensions to be neutralised, which 
could otherwise be potentially threatening for 
president Rahmon’s rule.
Tajikistan’s chronic weakness is organically 
linked to its dependence on its former metro-
pole – Moscow. This dependence has a constant 
and unbroken character, although its intensity 
has periodically weakened. Tajikistan in its cur-
rent form (borders, political institutions, etc.) 
is a result of Soviet policy in the region, and 
while being part of the USSR, the local com-
munist authorities were fully dependent on 
Moscow’s political will. After gaining inde-
pendence, the country has witnessed a bloody 
civil war (1992–1997) between the government 
in Dushanbe6 and the United Tajik Opposition7, 
which resulted in 100,000 death and 1.2 million 
refugees. During the civil war, Russia acted as 
the main arbiter between the competing clans, 
influenced the course of the conflict through 
its military presence (Russian troops fought on 
the government’s side), and ultimately became 
the guarantor of the peace agreements. After 
the war the situation in the country remained 
unstable, with the central government being 
unable to effectively control the entire territo-
ry of the state. This resulted in further politi-
cal dependence on Russian support. After the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and military operation in 
Afghanistan, Dushanbe opened up to coopera-
tion with the West (for example western aid and 
military presence), which allowed it to reduce, 
but not eliminate, the dependence on Russia in 
this aspect, and to force Moscow to make sev-
eral concessions (for example the withdrawal of 
the Russian border guards from the border with 
Afghanistan in 2005). Due to the weakness of 
the state, Dushanbe’s attempts to balance the 
influence of the various players did not bring 
a durable result and, along with the decrease 
6 Who represented the Leninabad and Kulob clans, which 
originated from the western, more developed parts of 
the country. 
7 A union of Islamic organisations and democratic forces, 
originating mainly from Gharm and to a lesser extent 
Badakhshan – the eastern and less developed parts of 
the country. 
The intensity, character and dynamics 
of Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia, 
as well as the lack of alternatives to it, al-
low the situation to be described as neo- 
-colonial, a term which is key in analysing 
the processes taking place in Tajikistan.  
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of western interest in the region (the end of 
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan), Russia has re-
turned to the role of Dushanbe’s unquestioned 
political patron.
Due to the structural and chronic character of 
Tajikistan’s weakness, as well as its geographic 
and historic settings, there are no alternatives 
to the state’s current political, social and eco-
nomic model, including the dependence on 
Moscow which it creates. It is also impossible 
to change the patron – China, the West, and 
regional powers such as Iran or India, despite 
their presence in Tajikistan, are neither interest-
ed nor capable of playing the role that Russia 
is playing. Additionally, due to the conviction 
established by the civil war, that the Russian 
support is necessary for the country’s leader, 
Rahmon’s successors will most probably not 
only make no attempt to limit the dependence 
on Russia – they are more likely to actively seek 
out its acceptance.
The mechanisms of neo-colonialism 
in Tajikistan 
Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia, and to 
a lesser extent China, is visible in the political, 
economic and social planes. The most vivid and 
well-known example of this multidimension-
al dependence is the presence of Tajik labour 
migrants in Russia. At the same time, depend-
ence from the metropoles is not followed by 
an impulse for Tajikistan’s development and 
modernisation generated by the above men-
tioned actors. It is in the interest of the old and 
new metropoles for Tajikistan to remain in its 
current state. Beijing is interested in stability 
in its proximity and the construction of trans-
port corridors in Tajikistan. That does require 
support for Tajik statehood, yet the country’s 
modernisation and transformation are not nec-
essary conditions. Moscow desires to retain its 
sphere of influence in Central Asia, and thus 
to keep Tajikistan weak enough to prevent 
Dushanbe from having alternatives to Russia, 
yet strong sufficiently not to collapse under the 
growing, chronic internal problems.
In the political and security dimensions, the 
mechanisms of Moscow’s neo-colonial policy 
are aimed above all at conserving Dushanbe’s 
dependence, limiting its space for political ma-
noeuvre, and thus making it necessary to satis-
fy Russian demands. Russia exploits the issues 
of stability and security in this regard, usually 
through negative stimuli – the threat of desta-
bilisation of the country were Dushanbe to act 
against Russian interests. The instruments of 
executing this threat – aside for the presence 
of Tajik labour migrants in Russia (which is key 
to country’s stability) include Moscow’s ability 
to support the regime’s internal8 and external9 
opponents, as well as its military presence. Rus-
sian forces have been present in Tajikistan since 
the beginning of the state’s existence – units 
of the 201st Russian military base (up-to 7,000 
strong) are stationed in the west and south of 
the country (Qurghonteppa and Dushanbe). 
Furthermore, Moscow utilises international or-
ganisations to institutionalise its influence, for 
example the Russia-dominated Collective Se-
curity Treaty Organisation (CSTO) which, while 
formally being a military alliance, allows Mos-
8 For example, the support for the Islamic Renaissance 
Party of Tajikistan in the form of allowing its leader Mu-
hiddin Kabiri to campaign amongst the Tajik labour mi-
grants in Russia. 
9 For example, military aid for Kyrgyzstan which is en-
gaged in a border conflict with Tajikistan. In 2012 Mos-
cow decided to transfer military equipment to Tajiki-
stan and Kyrgyzstan, officially to bolster their defence 
capabilities in the context of threats stemming from 
Afghanistan. Simultaneously, Kyrgyzstan, which does 
not border Afghanistan, is to receive aid valued at US $ 
1.1 billion, against Tajikistan’s US $ 200 million. 
Tajikistan’s dependence on the metropoles 
is not followed by an impulse for them to 
develop and modernise it. It is in the in-
terest of the old and new metropoles for 
Tajikistan to remain in its current state.
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cow to control Tajikistan in the security sphere 
(above all in the geopolitical dimension – the 
lack of a non-Russian military presence)10. 
One characteristic notion is that Tajikistan’s de-
pendence on Russia is only minimally limited 
by the dynamically growing Chinese economic 
engagement in this country. Paradoxically, the 
latter does not run counter to Russia’s inter-
ests, and is complementary to them in certain 
aspects. While Moscow possesses a wide array 
of political instruments aimed at leveraging Du-
shanbe, its economic offer is significantly small-
er and is concentrated mainly on the issue of 
labour migrants. Beyond that, Tajikistan is par-
tially dependent on Russia in the energy sec-
tor – almost all oil-based products and fuels are 
imported from Russia, which has exploited the 
export duties on them as a tool of leverage11. 
The Chinese offer, while also resulting in Ta-
jikistan’s dependency, is based above all on 
positive stimuli for cooperation, mainly loans 
and investments. Those are usually directed at 
infrastructural projects (mainly transport infra-
structure) and their amount during the period 
between 2014 and 2017 will equal US $ 6 bil-
lion12. They are an important source of income 
for the state (yet due to dysfunctional redistri-
bution, not for society), and enable the realisa-
tion of necessary investments which, without 
the Chinese assistance, Dushanbe would not 
be able to complete. This however, does not 
directly threaten Moscow’s interests – Beijing 
acknowledges Tajikistan as a part of the Rus-
sian sphere of influence, while the Chinese eco-
nomic engagement as such is not a rival to that 
of Russia. Due to the lack of significant Russian 
economic engagement in the country, it rather 
fills the niche left by Russia.
10 Further in: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-studies/2014-10-28/hostages-to-moscow-cli-
ents-beijing-security-central-asia-role-west
11 http://news.tj /ru/newspaper/article /rossiya-otme-
nila-tamozhennye-poshliny-na-gsm
12 Including US $ 3.2 billion for the construction of the Ta-
jik section of the IV line of the Turkmenistan – China gas 
pipeline; http://akipress.com/news:547591/
In the social, but also political and economic 
dimensions, the chief mechanism of Tajikistan’s 
dependence on Russia is the mass labour mi-
gration to Russia (862,000 people as of January 
2016)13. For a significant part of society the basic 
form of income is either work in Russia or remit-
tances from the migrants. These latter in 2014 
amounted to US $ 3.83 billion14, and compared 
with country’s GDP were equal to about 41% of 
its size (which is the highest coefficient globally).
For Dushanbe the massive scale of labour migra-
tion to Russia is on one hand a stabilising factor 
– it constitutes the main source of income for 
society and alleviates social tensions. However, 
it causes a far-reaching political and economic 
dependence on Russia. Due to the migration, 
the authorities are not forced to deal with the 
problem of providing society with a means 
of income (which, due to country’s economic 
weakness, they are not capable of doing do-
mestically), and in this way they simultaneously 
dispose themselves of the most active individu-
als from the country and thereby neutralise the 
threats to the regime’s stability stemming from 
society. Moscow, aware of the weight that the 
issue holds for Dushanbe, has played the mi-
gration card multiple times in its relations with 
Tajikistan, both through negative (mass raids 
and deportations of illegal migrants)15 and 
positive stimuli (facilitations for the labour mi-
grants from Tajikistan)16. 
13 Russian Federal Migration Service data. http://www.
fms.gov.ru/fms/activity/stats/Statistics/Svedenija_v_ot-
noshenii_inostrannih_grazh
14 Russian Central Bank data; http://www.cbr.ru/statis-
tics/?Prtid=svs&ch=Par_17101#CheckedItem
15 http://piter.tv/event/FMS_priznali_chto_oblava/
16 h t t p : / / w w w . b b c . c o m / r u s s i a n / r o l l i n g _
news/2013/02/130208_rn_tajikistan_migrants
In the social, but also political and eco-
nomic dimensions, the chief mechanism of 
Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia is the 
mass labour migration to Russia.
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Consequences of the dependence
The consequence of Tajikistan’s dependence on 
Russia is the conservation of the current sys-
tem. This on the one hand means relative sta-
bility for the state, but on the other increasing 
stagnation. These tendencies are visible both 
in the political and socio-civilisational dimen-
sions. In both of the aspects, they are in line 
with Russia’s interests and further strengthen 
its position. 
In the political dimension, the Russian support 
translates to the regime’s durability and the rise 
of President Rahmon’s position, which in turn 
leads to increasing authoritarianism in Tajik-
istan. This is true both in regard to the scale of 
influence that the president and his family exert 
on the state and economy, as well as the shrink-
ing space for political pluralism (for example 
the banning of the Islamic Revival Party of Ta-
jikistan)17 and control over society18. The role of 
Rahmon, who has ruled the country since 1994, 
is increasing, which can also be observed in 
the legal dimension – for example in December 
2015 the Tajik parliament passed a bill provid-
ing Rahmon with the status of “Leader of the 
Nation” which, besides the title, grants him 
lifelong immunity, which will not cease even 
when his presidential term ends19. The author-
17 The party was a part of the United Tajik Opposition and 
entered parliament after the civil war. In the political 
dimension, it postulates for a secular modernisation of 
the state, conducted with respect for Islamic values. For 
years it was the only opposition party present in the par-
liament and the only legally functioning Islamic party in 
the region. In March 2015 it did win enough votes to 
enter the parliament (which, due to the undemocratic 
character of the elections, was a political decision), and 
was criminalised and declared a terrorist organisation 
in September 2015. Currently some of its leaders are 
political emigrants (for example the party’s chairman 
Muhiddin Kabiri is residing in Turkey), while those who 
remained in Tajikistan are persecuted by the authorities. 
18 For example, strengthening the level of control over so-
cial and religious (especially Islamic) institutions indepen-
dent from the authorities, blocking access to information 
or limiting the freedom of operation for non-govern-
mental organisations; http://islamreview.ru/community/
ulemy-tadzikistana-obavili-vojnu-salafitam/, http://www.
osce.org/fom/125218 and http://www.rferl.org/content/
tajik-legalizes-blocking-internet/27386494.html
19 ht tp: / / w w w.aves ta .t j /goverment / 37193-par la -
ment-tadzhikistana-prinyal-zakonoproekt-o-lidere-na-
cii.html
itarianism also leads to Rahmon’s family being 
an important element of the political system, 
with his relatives holding important positions – 
for example Rahmon’s son Rustam is the head 
of the Customs Administration, his daughter 
Ozoda is the head of the President’s Apparatus, 
while her husband Jamoliddin Nuraliyev is dep-
uty minister of finance20. Additionally, the pres-
ident’s family is the keystone of the corruption 
system. Almost every branch of the economy is 
directly controlled by Rahmon’s relatives, who 
derive benefits from the companies subordinat-
ed to them, or participate in the income gener-
ated by other entrepreneurs21.
Mass labour migration from Tajikistan is not 
only the basic source of income for a substantial 
part of society, it is also a cause of additional 
social problems. The departure of at least 10% 
of the population from country, mainly men 
of working age22, causes for example, adverse 
demographic changes, the dependence of the 
entire communities on remittances from Russia, 
a deterioration in the situation of women – for 
example the return of legally forbidden polyga-
my on a scale which has elevated this phenom-
enon to the rank of a social problem23 – and 
Islamic radicalisation. This latter usually takes 
place during the stay in Russia, where on the 
one hand radical Islamic ideas are available, and 
on the other, migrants are often chastised and 
mistreated. Islamic radicalism is present in Tajik 
20 More in: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68408
21 ht tp: / /cabar.as ia / ru / ta j ik i s tan / 386 -nura l i - dav -
lat-tadzhikistan-korruptsiya-reshaet-vse
22 In November 2015, men aged between 18 and 29 made 
up about 40% of the labour migrants (355,000 people). 
Russian Federal Migration Service data. 
23 https:// iwpr.net /global-voices/despite-ban-polyga-
my-becoming-normal-tajikistan
The consequence of Tajikistan’s depen-
dence on Russia is the conservation of 
the current system. This on the one hand 
means relative stability for the state, but on 
the other increasing stagnation.
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society (one example of it can be the presence 
of several hundred Tajik citizens in the ranks 
of Islamic terrorist organisations in Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan)24, but it does not 
constitute an existential threat for Dushanbe25. 
Another negative tendency in Tajikistan caused 
by the neo-colonial stagnation is the civilisa-
tional regression, which is visible in two dimen-
sions – the infrastructural and the social. In the 
case of infrastructure, the problem consists of 
dilapidated state of the Soviet infrastructure: 
industrial (for example the aluminium plant 
TALCO), energy (energy turbines in the hydro-
electric power plants and the electric grid) and 
transport. It is made worse by the lack of funds 
for it to be renovated26. In the short term the 
situation is fixed by the financial aid received 
from international organisations and Chinese 
loans and investments in the transport infra-
structure. However, these are isolated actions, 
while the problem is of a systemic character. 
The civilisational regression also has a social 
aspect and can be seen in, for example, a re-
duction in educational standards, the lack of 
a qualified work force and experts, or the gen-
24 For example, the commander of the OMON militia spe-
cial forces, Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov, who in April of 
2015 fled to Syria, where he joined the ranks of Islamic 
State. More in: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-report/2015-09-21/homo-jihadicus
25 This can be illustrated even by the above mentioned 
case of the Colonel Khalimov (after radicalisation he 
chose to depart for Syria, rather than initiating the fight 
in Tajikistan), or by the lack of decisive action against the 
Tajik Islamic radicals abroad, while they are implement-
ed against the secular politicians opposed to Rahmon, 
utilising highly aggressive methods, including political 
assassination. 
26 More in: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/
asia/central-asia/201%20Central%20Asia%20-%20
Decay%20and%20Decline.pdf
eral decrease of the level of human capital27. 
The often described rise of the role of Islam in 
Tajikistan is also linked to the wider process of 
demodernisation of society (a return to the tra-
ditional structures), and at times it is impossible 
to tell these two processes apart. 
No prospects for a positive change
Due to the chronic and structural character of 
Tajikistan’s weakness, its neo-colonial depend-
ence on Russia, and the stagnation caused by 
the two above factors, an improvement of the 
situation in Tajikistan seems impossible. Most 
likely the processes currently in place will be-
come entrenched, resulting in further stagna-
tion. The only possible scenario of a qualitative 
change in the country is for the worse – the 
destabilisation of Tajikistan caused by a deteri-
oration of the situation in Russia. 
Tajikistan is not capable of generating impulses 
for modernisation internally. In the political di-
mension, aside from the structural factors, what 
hinders development is the lack of political will 
to change the model of how the state functions. 
Currently there are no alternatives to the rule of 
president Rahmon, who through amendments to 
the constitution eradicated the limit of presiden-
tial terms one can serve, and can thus become 
a lifelong leader. Additionally, even in the case of 
Rahmon’s departure from the political scene, his 
successor will probably originate from his milieu, 
and duplicate the same historically and culturally 
based mechanisms of power and model of rela-
tions between the state and society. Rahmon’s 
potential successors include the influential mayor 
of Dushanbe Mahmadsaid Ubaydulloyev, who 
for years has been stipulated as such, and the 
president’s closest relatives. The recent constitu-
tional amendments (for example the lowering of 
the required age of the presidential candidates) 
are often viewed in this context, as they would 
allow the participation of Rahmon’s son, Rustam, 
in the 2020 presidential elections28. 
27 Ibid.
28 http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-presidential-dy-
nasty-cleared/27532011.html
The often described rise of the role of 
Islam in Tajikistan is also linked to the wid-
er process of demodernisation of society, 
and at times it is impossible to tell these 
two processes apart. 
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The perspectives for an improvement in Tajik-
istan’s economic situation are also insignificant. 
The ambitious infrastructural projects planned 
by Dushanbe will not change that. The region’s 
largest hydroelectric power plant – Rogun – will 
most likely not enter the construction phase, due 
to a lack of financing from the World Bank (the 
US has blocked the financing of large hydroe-
lectric projects)29. Launching an electrical power 
line capable of exporting electricity to Afghani-
stan and Pakistan (the CASA 1000 project)30, or 
the IV line of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipe-
line (which will pass through Tajikistan)31 will not 
solve the systemic problems of the Tajik econo-
my. Also, the possible exploitation of the poten-
tial natural gas resources (estimated at even 3.2 
trillion m3)32, due to the state’s level of corrup-
tion and the lack of a mechanism of effective re-
distribution, is not going to significantly improve 
the socio-economic situation, and will not be an 
impulse for modernisation. 
Most likely the society will also fail to initiate 
changes in the country, Social problems and 
a poor economic situation do generate social 
tensions, yet those do not translate to rise of 
anti-government attitudes. This is caused by 
a wide range of factors such as the passiveness 
of Tajik society, the trauma generated by the 
civil war in the 1990s, the severely negative ex-
ample of destabilisation in the neighbouring 
Afghanistan and the absence of the country’s 
most active individuals due to the labour mi-
gration, which serves as a safety valve for social 
tensions. The situation may change in the fu-
ture, keeping in mind the Russian market’s di-
minishing capabilities to absorb the Tajik labour 
migrants caused by the deteriorating economic 
crisis in Russia, as well as Tajikistan’s fast demo-
graphic growth.
29 Appropriation Act H.R.3547 Section 7060, 7 D, 18th of 
January 2014, available at: https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3547/text
30 http://nation.com.pk/business/26-Nov-2015/agreement-
signed-for-casa-1000-transmission-line
31 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69976
32 More in: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-06-26/will-tajik-gas-change-balance-power-
central-asia
A negative scenario of the further develop-
ment of the situation in Tajikistan is possible, 
though its probability is not high. Socio-eco-
nomic problems constitute the main challenge. 
The economic situation in Tajikistan will further 
deteriorate due to the economic crisis in Russia 
and depreciation of the rouble. The recession in 
Russia has lowered the demand for the labour 
force from Tajikistan, while the rouble’s depre-
ciation in relation to the US dollar (the curren-
cy in which the transfers to Tajikistan are con-
ducted) has significantly lowered the value of 
remittances from the labour migrants. In the III 
quarter of 2015 they dropped to almost a quar-
ter of their rate in the same quarter of the previ-
ous year (from US $ 1.348 billion in QIII 2014 to 
US $ 358 million in QIII 2015)33. Simultaneous-
ly, the number of Tajiks in Russia has dropped 
by only 19% (from 1.101 million to 890,000)34. 
The lack of symmetry between those two num-
bers is caused by the lack of alternatives to 
working in Russia and the somoni’s depreciation 
against the US dollar (by about 49.6% since De-
cember 2014), which serves as a cushion for the 
lower remittances from the migrants. Neverthe-
less, the depreciation of the somoni negatively 
influences the Tajik economy – due to undevel-
oped exports it cannot be utilised to increase 
the competitiveness of Tajik goods on external 
markets, yet the trade deficit continues to grow. 
If the remittances from the labour migrants con-
tinues to drop, the risk of social unrest occur-
ring will grow. Combined with the animosities 
between the various regions (and the clans rep-
33 See the Appendix.
34 Russian Federal Migration Service data.
The perspectives for an improvement 
in Tajikistan’s economic situation are 
also insignificant. The ambitious infra-
structural projects planned by Dushanbe 
will not change that.
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resenting them), this may lead to the destabi-
lisation of the state. The situation is being fur-
ther complicated by the strained relations with 
neighbouring countries – local incidents and 
border conflicts occur regularly on the border 
with Kyrgyzstan, and relations with Uzbekistan 
have been uneasy since independence (lately 
attempts to improve the situation have be ob-
served, for example the first consultations be-
tween the foreign ministries of the two states 
held in December of 2015; however, the full nor-
malisation of the relations is a distant prospect). 
The case of Tajikistan’s post-Soviet, neo-colo-
nial stagnation, while extreme, is not solitary. 
The mechanisms responsible for the lack of 
perspectives for improvement in Tajikistan – 
the combination of an authoritarian, corrupt 
government, weak and ineffective state institu-
tions, a pauperised and passive society, as well 
as the economic and political dependence on 
old and new metropoles – is present on a small-
er scale also in the other smaller states of the 
former USSR which lack hydrocarbon resources 
– above all Kyrgyzstan and Armenia.
Remittances from Tajik labour migrants in Russia (US $ million/quarter)
* http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=Par_17101#CheckedItem
Data: Central Bank of the Russian Federation*
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